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I. INTRODUCTION
Do criminal fines alone really punish, deter and rehabilitate
corporations, partnerships and other organizations' convicted of
environmental crime or should courts couple fines with alternative
sanctions such as restitution, remedial orders, community service
and probationary conditions to achieve these goals as well as to ben-
efit the environment?
Federal judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and academi-
cians have wrestled for several decades with the general question of
how best to punish organizations convicted of criminal acts, and
two divergent philosophies have emerged.2 On one side of the de-
bate are the "economic" advocates. These advocates generally be-
lieve that fines, set sufficiently high, will achieve the punishment,
deterrence, public safety and rehabilitation goals of criminal pun-
ishment by changing organizational behavior while minimizing fur-
ther costs to society in terms of enforcement, punishment and
oversight 3 Opposing the economic advocates are the "corporate
reformists." These advocates generally believe that because compa-
nies pass any imposed fines on to other groups, such as stockhold-
ers and consumers, fines fail to have any punishment, deterrent or
rehabilitative effect on the organization or the people in it.4
1. Federal environmental statutes broadly define the term "person" in making
certain acts illegal. For example, the Glean Air Act defines the term "person" as
"an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political
subdivision of a State, and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the
United States and any officer, agent or employee thereof." Clean Air Act ("CAA")
§ 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the purposes of this
Article, "organization" means all "persons" regulated by environmental statues
other than natural persons.
2. See Christopher A. Wray, Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 YALE LJ. 2017, 2019-21 (1992) (explaining that two views on
corporate punishment have evolved).
3. SeeJeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying
Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. J. CRM. L. 513, 570-73 (1989). In Parker's
view, there are four reasons for the "superiority of monetary penalties for organiza-
tions": the responsiveness of businesses to fines, fines are easier to "scale" to harm,
lower government costs and minimum social harm from the impact of punish-
ment. Id. at 570.
4. See Richard Gruner, To Let The Punishment Fit The Organization: Sanctioning
Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CrM. L. 1, 5-7 (1988).
Gruner cites several advantages of using probation when sentencing organizations.
Such sentences will: force high-level executives to adopt specific measures to avoid
1995]
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This Article is not an exhaustive analysis of the pros and cons
of organizational sentencing.5 Rather, it raises a narrower issue
with legal and public policy components. First, do federal judges
have the legal authority to sentence organizational defendants to
provide restitution or perform remedial orders, community service,
or probationary conditions in the form of alternative sanctions such
as beneficial environmental projects ("BEPs") in addition to mone-
tary fines?6 Second, if such authority exists, is it wise and useful
public policy to expend additional governmental and private re-
sources to design, implement and oversee performance of such
sentences via the criminal justice system particularly when most
judges, prosecutors and probation officers have little broad-based
experience with environmental problems, regulations and objec-
tives? Answering these questions requires consideration of two
legal trends which emerged in the 1980s: the development and mat-
uration of the federal government's environmental criminal en-
forcement program and expansion of federal judges' sentencing
options, particularly in the areas of restitution, remedial orders,
community service and probation.7 This Article concludes that the
convergence of an active environmental criminal enforcement pro-
gram and expansion of a court's sentencing authority presents
judges with an opportunity to impose meaningful punishment
which combines fines with alternative sanctions to achieve equally
important societal goals: just punishment and environmental
protection.
future criminal conduct, help insure that defendants carry out corrective internal
measures, impose punitive burdens more difficult to transfer to others than fines
and will require actions which lower the reputations of firms and executives,
thereby providing greater punishment and deterrence than fines. Id.
5. For a summary of competeing philosphies and extensive citations to legal
literature on this subject, see Wray, supra note 2, at 2019-21.
6. This Article's focus on organizational punishment is not meant to suggest
that BEPs may never be used by courts in sentencing individuals. However, the use
of BEPs with individuals presents several additional issues which generally are not
faced when dealing with organizations. Because individuals face the threat ofjail
time for environmental crime, the possibility exists that prosecutors, defense attor-
neys and judges will "trade" jail time for performance of BEPs. See generally United
States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G., Ch. 8, Part 2Q (1993). Such manipulation
of the individual sentencing guidelines would destroy Congress' desire for consis-
tency in sentencing. Additionally, given the sometimes expensive costs of BEPs, it
is likely that organizations will be in a better position to finance performance.
7. See Gruner, supra note 4, at 26-106. "After a decade of unsuccessful efforts,
Congress enacted sweeping criminal sentencing reforms in the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984." Id. at 26. These reforms include the availability of the following sen-
tencing options for organizations: fines, probation, forfeiture, notice to victims
and restitution. Parker, supra note 3, at 545.
4
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In Section II, this Article will introduce the concept of BEPs as
an alternative sanction and examine the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's ("EPA") practice of permitting defendants
in civil or administrative enforcement actions to perform similar
tasks in exchange for reduced civil penalties. It will then discuss
why the universe of acceptable beneficial tasks should be broader in
criminal prosecutions. Specific cases will be used to illustrate how
the participants in criminal environmental cases have fashioned
creative sanctions combining fines and BEPs in a wide-ranging
manner.
In order to understand and appreciate the current legal set-
ting, to avoid mistakes of the past, and to utilize existing legal crite-
ria when evaluating BEPs, it is imperative that we also examine the
past in terms of environmental prosecutions and sentencing law
and theory. Consequently, Section III will examine the historical
development of environmental prosecutions in the United States.
Section IV will then review the history of sentencing organizational
defendants for criminal transgressions, particularly the imposition
of organizational probation, and will focus on the evolving changes
in federal sentencing wrought by Congress' enactment of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SPA").8
In Section V, this Article will identify and discuss several legal
and policy issues presented by using BEPs in criminal environmen-
tal enforcement. This Article will conclude in Section VI that Con-
gress has given federal judges the authority to impose BEPs on
organizational defendants and that, notwithstanding certain institu-
tional difficulties and societal costs, imposition and implementation
of such tasks is better public policy in appropriate cases than a sen-
tence which merely requires a corporation to pay the federal gov-
ernment on the day of sentencing. Finally, this Article will set forth
basic criteria which participants in the criminal justice system
should follow in order to make BEPs meaningful, reduce overall
societal costs, and ensure the appropriate use of BEPs as part of
punishment. The criteria are based on common themes found in
EPA's use of similar procedures in administrative and civil environ-
mental enforcement, past and current federal sentencing statutes,
and the current organizational sentencing guidelines.
8. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§§ 3551-85).
2471995]
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II. WHAT IS A BENEFICIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT?
In its simplest form, a BEP can be a requirement that a defend-
ant pick up roadside litter surrounding its facility for a period of
time. At the other extreme, a BEP may require a defendant to en-
gage in costly product reformulation, to install expensive pollution
prevention hardware or to undertake complex environmental
cleanup. BEPs may be imposed as restitution, either in the form of
monetary payments or repair of damaged natural resources,
cleanup of polluted areas, or performance of community service or
probationary conditions. For the purposes of this Article, a BEP is a
sanction, usually coupled with a fine, which requires the defendant
to undertake, assure or fund the performance of environmentally-
friendly tasks reasonably related to the organization's criminal con-
duct and achievement of at least one of the four Congressional
objectives of sentencing, namely punishment, deterrence, protec-
tion and rehabilitation.
EPA's use of Supplemental Environmental Projects ("SEPs"), a
narrower concept in civil environmental enforcement, is a good
starting point in determining what BEPs are and how they can be
incorporated into criminal enforcement. Examining SEPs will help
identify broad categories of potential BEPs and criteria which the
Agency uses in deciding whether to accept such projects in specific
cases.
A. EPA and SEPs
When it brings an administrative or civil judicial enforcement
action, EPA seeks compliance, injunctive relief and/or civil penal-
ties.9 The Agency sometimes modifies the amount of a civil penalty
in a particular case in exchange for performance of SEPs. Accord-
ing to EPA, SEPs are "environmentally beneficial projects which a
defendant/respondent agrees to undertake in settlement of an en-
forcement action, but which the defendant/respondent is not
otherwise legally required to perform." 10 The Agency utilizes SEPs
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (a).
10. See Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Projects Policy, 60 Fed. Reg.
24,856, 24,857-58 (1995) [hereinafter Revised SEP Policy] (emphasis omitted).
EPA defines each of the key phrases in the SEP Policy. "Environmentally ben-
eficial means a SEP must improve, protect or reduce risks to public health or the
environment at large." Id. at 24,857. "In settlement of an enforcement action"
means the violator has not begun the project prior to the Agency's identification
of a violation and that the Agency helps shape the SEP through the enforcement
process. Id. "Not otherwise legally required to perform" means the defendant is
not already required by federal, state or local law to take such action. Id.
6
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to "obtain environmental and public health protection and im-
provements" which otherwise might not be achieved."
In its current SEP policy, EPA sets forth seven categories of
projects which the Agency will consider as SEPs. They are: public
health projects directly related to the violation, such as diagnostic,
preventive, or remedial actions; pollution prevention, pollution re-
duction, environmental restoration and protection, environmental
assessments and audits, environmental compliance promotion, and
emergency planning and preparedness. 12 The Agency evaluates
SEPs in a hierarchal fashion, with SEPs designed to prevent pollu-
tion from occurring being the most favored.' 3 The Agency also spe-
cifically rejects certain tasks which may have been permitted in the
past such as general environmental educational programs, contri-
butions to environmental research at colleges or universities, and
projects unrelated to environmental protection. 14
EPA's identification of the types of SEPs it will consider and
those which it will reject stems from both programmatic and legal
concerns. The Agency's emphasis on pollution prevention is in
keeping with its statutory mission and the idea that it is better to
prevent pollution from occurring rather than controlling it at the
end of a discharge pipe or smokestack.' 5
However, EPA also recognizes that there are statutory and Con-
stitutional concerns which restrict the Agency's ability to approve
certain SEPs.16 Thus, the SEP must meet five legal criteria. First,
an adequate "nexus" or "relationship between the violation and
proposed project" must exist.'7 To satisfy this criterion, the SEP
need not involve the same pollutant as the violation, and the SEP
may involve the site of the violation, or be within the "immediate
11. Id. at 24,856.
12. Id. at 24,858-60.
13. Revised SEP Policy, supra note 10, at 24,856-57. "A pollution prevention
project is one which reduces the generation of pollution through 'source reduc-
tion,' i.e., any practice which reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pol-
lutant or contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise being released into
the environment, prior to recycling, treatment or disposal." Id at 24,858.
14. Id. at 24,860. These exclusions mirror projects fashioned by district court
judges in sentencing organizations for criminal conduct under former federal sen-
tencing law.
15. Id. at 24,857.
16. Id. at 24,857-58.
17. Reviged SEP Policy, supra note 10, at 24,857-58. According to EPA, the
nexus "relationship exists only if the project remediates or reduces the probable
overall environmental or public health impacts or risks to which the violation at
issue contributes, or if the project is designed to reduce the likelihood that similar
violations will occur in the future." Id at 24,858.
1995] 249
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geographical area" of the site of the violation, or within the same
ecosystem. 18 Second, a SEP must advance at least one of the objec-
tives of the statute violated by the defendant. 19 Third, EPA or other
federal agencies may not play "any role in managing or controlling
funds that may be set aside or escrowed for performance of a
SEP. '20 Fourth, the settlement agreement must specify the "what,
where and when" of a project rather than leaving such matters to
further determination. 2' Finally, the project may not be something
EPA is required by law to do or provide EPA with additional re-
sources outside the Congressional appropriations process. 22
EPA's SEP policy is designed to permit Agency personnel to
settle enforcement actions for reduced civil penalties in exchange
for SEPs.23 However, defendants generally will not receive a "dol-
lar-for-dollar" credit, since EPA will not reduce its civil penalty by
one dollar for each dollar spent on the SEP, and EPA will not re-
duce the penalty below the "economic benefit" obtained by the vio-
lator through noncompliance. 24
B. Are BEPs Distinguishable From SEPs?
EPA uses the term SEP because the Agency believes it should
not reduce or mitigate civil penalties which may otherwise be im-
posed simply because a defendant promises to perform tasks al-
ready required by law.25 It is appropriate in certain circumstances
to combine tasks such as restitution or environmental remediation
or cleanup to satisfy a criminal sentence. In such cases, courts in-
corporate a defendant's civil obligation into the criminal sentence.
While EPA would not approve such actions as SEPs in civil cases,
18. Id. The Agency defines "immediate geographical area" as the area within
a 50-mile radius of the site of the illegal activity. Id. at 24,858 n.5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Revised SEP Policy, supra note 10, at 24,857-58.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 24,860.
24. Id. at 24,860-61. EPA states its penalty rationale in the SEP Policy:
Penalties are an important part of any settlement. A substantial penalty is
generally necessary for legal and policy reasons. Without penalties there
would be no deterrence as regulated entities would have little incentive to
comply. Penalties are necessary as a matter of fairness to those compa-
nies that make the necessary expenditures to comply on time: violators
should not be allowed to obtain an economic advantage over their com-
petition who complied.
Id at 24,860.
25. See EPA Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in En-
forcement Settlements, 1, 4 (February 12, 1991) [hereinafter Original SEP Policy].
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there are benefits to making them part of a criminal punishment.
Moreover, in some criminal cases, it may be useful to have a corpo-
rate defendant undertake activities akin to EPA's view of SEPs, in
other words, tasks which prevent or reduce pollution but which are
not legally required. Given the potential broad range of activities
which may be ordered as part of a criminal sentence, it is inappro-
priate to transfer EPA's SEP phraseology to criminal sentencing.
Consequently, this Article uses "beneficial environmental projects"
or BEPs to reflect the fact that both existing legal obligations and
additional tasks may be included in criminal sentences.
C. Examples of BEPs in Criminal Cases
Prosecutors, EPA attorneys, criminal investigators, defense at-
torneys and judges have become increasingly creative in their at-
tempts to include BEPs in environmental criminal cases. While it is
impossible to definitively categorize the different permutations this
creativity has taken, a brief examination of several cases illustrates
the broad nature and scope of these activities. These descriptions
will also be useful when thinking about the legal and policy issues
discussed later in this Article.
1. BEPs: Going Beyond What Is Legally Required
In United States v. Norwood Industries, Inc.,26 the defendant, an
adhesive tape manufacturer located in suburban Philadelphia,
emitted regulated volatile organic compounds ("VOCs") in excess
of applicable emission limits. Civilly, the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") and Norwood entered into
an administrative agreement in which the company agreed to in-
stall pollution control hardware, and to pay a seven-figure civil pen-
alty.27 To settle the criminal prosecution, the United States and
Norwood fashioned a settlement which required the company to
perform several BEPs exceeding applicable legal requirements,
which included: (1) spending at least $30,000 annually for five
years on research to convert its operations to non-VOC use; (2) de-
veloping formal corporate environmental compliance procedures;
(3) hiring an outside consultant to audit all environmental aspects
of its operation; (4) moving all hazardous waste storage inside its
facility; and (5) sponsoring a free conference for small businesses
26. No. 2:94CR00034-1 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (on file with author).
27. In Re Norwood Indus., Inc. & Seton Co., Consent Order and Agreement,
No. 90613C (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with author).
1995]
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on VOC compliance.2 8 Additionally, the centerpiece of the plea
agreement required Norwood to convert its production employees
from a five-day work week to a three or four-day work week for the
purpose of limiting employee commuting in an attempt to reduce
automobile emissions and ground-level ozone.2 9 At sentencing, the
court fined the company $100,000, but suspended the fine on per-
formance of the BEPs as conditions of probation.30
2. BEPs: Incorporating or Aiding Performance of Legally Required
Tasks
A substantial number of criminal sentences incorporate pre-
existing regulatory requirements or legal obligations arising out of
the criminal conduct into the criminal sentence in terms of a gen-
eral requirement to comply. In United States v. Action Manufactur-
ing, Inc.,31 the defendant company pled guilty to disposing of
explosives-related hazardous waste illegally, and EPA and the de-
fendant pursued remedial cleanup at the site.32 The parties agreed
that the defendant would place $500,000 in an escrow account at
sentencing as a condition of probation, with the money to be used
exclusively for the company's cleanup pursuant to a plan approved
by either EPA or the state regulatory agency.33 At sentencing, the
court fined Action $500,000, but suspended $400,000 pending com-
pletion of the remedial action. 34
3. BEPs: Transfering Money or Property to Third Parties
Another type of BEP requires defendants to transfer money,
land or other assets to a third party. This is simple when the de-
fendant merely is reimbursing a third party, such as a government
agency or private individual, for cleanup costs incurred because of
the defendant's illegal conduct. However, BEPs have also been
28. United States v. Norwood Indus., Inc., Plea Agreement, No. 94-34 (Feb.
28, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Norwood Plea Agreement].
29. Id. at 7-8.
30. The conservative estimate of the cost of the BEPs to the defendant is
$250,000.
31. No. 93-365 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (on file with author).
32. United States v. Action Mfg., Inc., Plea Agreement No. 93-365, (March 12,
1993) (on file with author).
33. Id. at 2-5. The company had to submit its cleanup expenditures for the
pits to an EPA criminal enforcement attorney for review. Id. Until the costs re-
lated to the cleanup of the pits were determined, Action could not use the
$500,000 to pay those costs, but had to come up with additional money. Id. at 9.
34. Id. at 2-3.
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used as restitution on a broader scale with less clearly identifiable
victims.
The Exxon Valdez Alaskan oil spill prosecution is perhaps the
most well known environmental criminal case. The United States
prosecuted the Exxon Corporation and a subsidiary in 1991 for vio-
lations of several environmental statutes. Pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, the court fined the two entities a total of $150 million.3 5 The
court remitted $125 million of that amount based on factors which
included Exxon's cleanup costs for the oil spill and payments to
injured parties.36 The defendants paid $12 million of the remain-
ing $25 million fine into the North American Wetlands Conserva-
tion Fund,3 7 a Congressionally created trust fund.38 In addition, the
defendants paid $100 million in remedial and compensatory pay-
ments.39 According to the plea agreement, this money was to be
used "exclusively for restoration projects, within the State of
Alaska."40
The 1994 prosecution of Steven Burnett and Dean Schrader,
while involving individual defendants, illustrates how trust fund
sentences have been created. The two men pled guilty to negligent
violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 41 involving the dis-
charge of dredge material in wetlands in Washington state.4 2 As
part of the plea agreement, the defendants agreed to place between
$150,000 and $200,000 into a wetlands preservation trust fund cre-
ated as part of the settlement to preserve wetlands in the area of the
defendants' illegal activity, with the final amount left up to the
35. See United States v. Exxon Corp., Plea Agreement, No. A90-015 (October
7, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Exxon Plea Agreement].
36. 1d. at 6-8. Some of these factors involved Exxon's commitment to per-
form tasks not otherwise legally required, such as spending 25% of its total re-
search expenditures on environmental and safety issues. In this regard, the factors
resemble BEPs employed in the Norwood case. For a further discussion of Norwood,
see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
37. Exxon Plea Agreement, supra note 35, at 8.
38. See 16 U.S.C. § 4406(b).
39. Exxon Plea Agreement, supra note 35, at 8-9. The $100 million payment
consisted of $50 million paid to both the State of Alaska and the United States. Id.
40. Id. at 9. The plea agreement defined restoration to include "restoration,
replacement and enhancement of affected resources, acquisition of equivalent re-
sources and services, and long-term environmental monitoring and research pro-
grams directed to the prevention, containment, cleanup and amelioration of oil
spills." Id.
41. Clean Water Act ("CWA") §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
42. See CWA § 309(c) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) (A).
1995]
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court.4 The plea agreement also recommended that the court im-
pose community service on the defendants in the field of wetlands
preservation. 44 At sentencing, the court ordered restitution in the
amount of $150,000, the minimum amount specified in the plea
agreement. Additionally, the court imposed the payment of restitu-
tion and performance of fifty hours of community service as condi-
tions of probation.45
A different form of property transfer occurred in United States
v. Hartford Associates.46 The defendant, a limited partnership which
had drained substantial portions of wetlands to develop a site with-
out a permit, pled guilty to negligently violating the CWA,47 and
agreed to pay a $100,000 fine.48 More importantly for the environ-
ment, the partnership granted a conservation easement on approxi-
mately 100 acres of wetlands on the site to an environmental group
in the state.49
III. HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
All of the sentences discussed above resulted from plea negoti-
ations. Since most sentences of this type will result from such plea
agreements, 50 it is important to ensure that they are both legal and
defensible in terms of public policy. Before considering their legal
and policy merits, however, it is essential to review the evolution of
two legal developments, namely the initiation and maturation of a
federal environmental criminal prosecution effort and the expan-
sion of sentencing options governing organizations convicted of
criminal conduct.
Federal criminal laws punishing those polluting the environ-
ment have existed since at least 1899 when Congress enacted legis-
43. United States v. Burnett, Plea Agreement, No. CR94-5412W (October 3,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Burnett Plea Agreement].
44. Id. at 4.
45. Telephone Conversation with Mark Bartlett, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, District of Washington.
46. No. WN-93-0344 (D. Md. 1993).
47. See CWA § 309(c) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) (A).
48. See United States v. Hartford Assoc., Plea Agreement (October 8, 1993)
(on file with author).
49. See id.
50. This is not to say that one of the parties or the court may not pursue such
sentences independently. The alternative sentencing cases struck down by the ap-
pellate courts under the Federal Probation Act were objected to by one party or
another, otherwise, they would not have been appealed. However, when the par-
ties are in agreement, it is unlikely the court will reject the settlement, thus
preventing appellate review.
12
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lation designed primarily to aid navigation. 51 Since that time, and
especially since 1970, Congress has enacted a series of statutes
broadly designed to protect the environment and human health.52
All of these statutes subject both individuals and organizations to
criminal liability for certain types of offenses committed with
varying degrees of mens rea.53 Despite the presence of such
prosecutorial authority, the federal government did not mount any
systematic criminal enforcement effort for many years.,4 Instead,
the United States pursued environmental cases on an ad hoc basic
when acts of pollution and illegal behavior were so flagrant they
could not be ignored.55
In 1980, EPA, in conjunction with the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), initiated a pilot program to determine if a formal criminal
law enforcement program should be developed within the
Agency.5 6 After a two-year trial, the Agency and the DOJ decided to
open a formal program, with EPA hiring twenty-three criminal in-
vestigators in October of 1982. 57 In early 1983, DOJ established
51. See Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1964) (Act of March 3,
1899, Chap. 425, § 13; 30 Stat. 1152) ("It shall not be lawful to throw... any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets
and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the
United States ... .")
52. See e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFPA")
§§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Toxic Substance Control
Act ("TCSA"), §§ 2-412, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); CWA
§§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Safe Drinking Water
Act ("SDWA") §§ 1401-65, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-330j-26 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-
92k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Clean Air Act ("CAA") §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7 671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
53. See e.g., TSCA, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (knowing or willful acts);
CWA, § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (knowing and negligent crimes); RCRA,
§ 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (knowing violations); CAA, § 113(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c) (knowing and negligent conduct); CERCLA, § 103(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(b) (knowing actions).
54. Heleni. Bruner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective Tiew, 22
ENvrL. L. 1315, 1318 (1992) (stating no standard mechanisms for initiation of en-
vironmental criminal cases existed until 1980s).
55. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. I.R.S., 40 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1660 (3d
Cir. Feb. 23, 1995). The United States prosecuted the defendant in connection
with Kepone poisoning in the James River in Virginia. Adopting a form of alterna-
tive sentencing, the court first fined Allied Chemical $13.24 million, the statutory
maximum, but then reduced the fine to $4.5 million when the defendant created
and contributed $8 million to the Virginia Environmental Endowment. James W.
Rodig, Corporate Contributions to Charity, 9 J. CoRP. L. 241, 247 (1984).
56. See Bruner, supra note 54 at 1320 (explaining that EPA experimented by
hiring three criminal investigators).
57. Id. at 1315.
19951 255
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what is now the Environmental Crimes Section ("ECS"), a group of
criminal environmental prosecutors based in Washington, D.C.58
By 1990, EPA had slowly increased its number of criminal in-
vestigators to approximately forty-five, still less than one agent per
state, and had assigned at least one attorney in each of the ten re-
gional offices to work exclusively on criminal cases.5 9 These num-
bers did not impress Congress and as a result, Congress approved
the Pollution Prosecution Act.60 This legislation directed EPA to
increase its total number of special agents to 200 by October 1,
1995 and set specific annual staffing levels for criminal investiga-
tors.61 As of December 31, 1994, the Agency has met each annual
target and has approximately 140 agents located in thirty offices
scattered throughout the United States. 62
While EPA added to the size of its investigative and legal forces
in the 1980s, DOJ increased the size of the ECS in Washington, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation began to investigate environ-
mental matters on a routine basis.63 Additionally, in the late 1980s,
federal prosecutors in local United States Attorney's Offices be-
came increasingly interested in prosecuting criminal environmental
violations.
64
58. Id. at 1323. The Environmental Crimes Section grew from four lawyers at
its inception to twenty-five lawyers ten years later. Id.
59. Id. at 1325 (explaining legislation introduced due to concern with small
number of investigators).
60. P.L. No. 101-593, Title II, §§ 201-205, 104 Stat. 2962 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
61. See Bruner, supra note 54, at 1325. "This Act... provides for a fourfold
increase in the number of investigators by 1995 .... It [also] mandates the estab-
lishment of a National Enforcement Training Institute to provide training to fed-
eral, state and local personnel with regard to both criminal and civil enforcement."
Id.
62. Telephone conversation with Steven E. Chester, Deputy Director, EPA Of-
fice of Criminal Enforcement.
63. The Federal Bureau of Investigations and EPA investigate many cases
jointly, but they also investigate environmental violations independently or with
other federal agencies, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Naval
Criminal Investigative Service, and the Army's Criminal Investigation Division as
well as with various state agencies.
64. Chapter 11, Tide 5, United States Attorney's Manual, transmitted to
United States Attorneys August 23, 1994. By 1994, Assistant United States Attor-
neys ("AUSA") handled the majority of federal environmental prosecutions, with
the Washington-based Environmental Crimes Section ("ECS") handling some
cases directly and supporting AUSAs in other cases. Id. The result of this increase
in resources and interest has been predictable. According to DOJ statistics, the
United States prosecuted 973 individuals and 391 organizations for criminal envi-
ronmental violations between October 1, 1982 and September 30, 1994. Environ-
mental Criminal Statistics FY 83 through FY 1994 (Memorandum to Ronald
Sarachan, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section, Department of Justice (Nov. 18,
1994)). Of the 1364 defendants, approximately 58% percent have been charged
14
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING AND PROBATION: THE
HISTORICAL PERSPECTWE
As the government's environmental prosecution program be-
gan to mature, Congress initiated a process of replacing antiquated
sentencing practices with a completely new set of rules.
A. History of Corporate Probation
In 1916, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Ex Pane
United States,65 that federal courts lacked authority to impose proba-
tion on any defendant absent statutory authorization. 66 Congress
responded in 1925 by enacting the Federal Probation Act
("FPA").67 This statute authorized federal courts to suspend impo-
sition or execution of a sentence and place a defendant on up to
five years' probation "upon such terms and conditions as the court
deemed best" when it was satisfied that "the ends ofjustice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant [would] be
served thereby."68 Thus, under the FPA, probation was not a direct
sentence, but one which required the court to suspend the sen-
tence imposed pursuant to the substantive statute of conviction.
The FPA also authorized courts to make defendants pay a fine while
on probation, to make restitution to "aggrieved parties" for actual
damages or loss caused by the offense and to undergo rehabilitative
treatment 69 The FPA's language did not distinguish between indi-
vidual and organizational defendants, and courts were very slow to
impose probation on businesses. Instead, judges fined organiza-
tions for criminal conduct, apparently giving no consideration to
imposing probationary conditions on organizations.
in the past five years alone. Id. Courts have imposed more than $290 million in
criminal fines, restitution and dean-up costs on individuals and organizations and
over 530 years of prison time. Id.
65. 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
66. Id. at 44 (holding judiciary cannot suspend criminal sentences without
legislative authority).
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56"(1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 (1988)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Federal courts were not able to suspend sentences
when the defendant was convicted of any offense punishable by death or life im-
prisonment. Id.
69. Id. Additionally, the court was authorized to require a defendant "to re-
side in or participate in the program of a residential community treatment center,
or both, for all or part of the period of probation" subject to the Attorney Gen-
eral's approval. Id.
1995]
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This judicial attitude began to change with the often-cited case
of United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.70 In 1971, the Coast Guard
caught Atlantic Richfield discharging oil from a dock facility in Illi-
nois into the Chicago Ship and Sanitary Canal. 71 Atlantic Richfield
pled nolo contendere to violating the Rivers and Harbors Act-72 In-
stead of fining the company the then-statutory maximum of $2,500,
the district court suspended imposition of a fine and imposed a six-
month period of probation.73 The court then imposed specific
conditions of probation, including a requirement that Atlantic
Richfield establish a program to respond to oil spills.74 The court
also said it would appoint a trustee-like probation officer who pre-
sumably would implement the first condition if the defendant
failed to do so.75
On appeal by the defendant, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the FPA permitted courts to suspend sentences and
impose probation on corporations. 76 However, the court found
that the special conditions of probation imposed by the district
court were unreasonable because they exceeded the scope of the
court's authority under the FPA.77 The Seventh Circuit stated that
the imposition of probation under the FPA was designed to rehabil-
itate or supervise the defendant to prevent future illegal acts, not to
be "used as a means of imposing unreasonable standards to the ex-
tent that the probationer may not know when they are satisfied."78
After this decision, district courts began to impose corporate
probation more frequently, often suspending payment of fines in
exchange for payment of money to charities or donation of serv-
ices.79 However, federal appellate courts generally found that re-
70. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 59.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Atlantic Richfied, 465 F.2d at 59. The court required the company to set
up and complete the program within 45 days. Id.
75. Id. at 59.
76. Id. at 61.
77. Id. "In our opinion, the broad requirement imposed upon the defendant
as a condition of probation goes beyond what was intended by the drafters of the
Probation Act." Id.
78. Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 61.
79. Judges had varying reasons for developing these sentences, but appellate
opinions suggest that trial courts were frustrated in fashioning meaningful sanc-
tions for businesses. For example, when sentencing the Japanese industrial giant
Mitsibushi in the early 1980s, the district court stated, "these large corporate de-
fendants could just write a check and walk away.'" United States v. Mitsibushi
Int'l. Co., 677 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1982).
16
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quiring charitable donations exceeded the statutory authority
contained in the FPA for two reasons.80 First, the probationary con-
ditions did not bear a reasonable relationship to the rehabilitation
of the defendant or protection of the public, the goals of the FPA.8'
Second, the statute's restitution provision did not authorize such
sentences because the charitable organizations were not victims, as
they had not suffered a loss as a result of the offense.8 2
For example, in United States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co.,8 3
an anti-trust prosecution, the defendant sought an "alternative sen-
tence" which would reduce its fine from $2 million to $100,000 in
exchange for a $1.4 million contribution to the University of Ne-
braska.8 4 The trial court imposed a $2 million fine, suspended all
but $325,000 of it and ordered the defendant to contribute $1.475
million to the University of Nebraska.85 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed en banc, finding that the probationary conditions exceeded
the court's authority under the FPA's provisions concerning non-
fine monetary payments.8 6
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion a few months
later in United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc.,87 an anti-trust prose-
cution involving concert promoters.88 The government appealed
the district court's suspension of a fine conditioned on the defend-
ants' using its talents and expertise to raise and donate $100,000 to
80. See Gruner, supra note 4, at 23. Initially, the Eighth Circuit held that re-
quiring charitable contributions was permissible. Id. at 23 n.111. However, the
Eighth Circuit reversed its holding in United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co.,
741 F.2d 1542, 1544 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Id.
81. See Gruner, supra note 4, at 23 n.112.
82. Id. at 23-24. However, one court did allow a charitable organization to
receive money from a corporate probationer because it "was serving as a 'conduit'
to efficently transfer restitution payments to injured parties." Id. at 24 n.115 (citing
United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984)).
83. 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
84. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1545. This contribution to the University of
Nebraska was to be used to either endow a professorship in ethics, or to fund the
construction of an addition to the school's College of Engineering and establish-
ment of a permanent ethics program in business and engineering. Id.
85. Id. The contribution was to be used for a professorship in ethics. Id.
86. Id. at 1548. The Eighth Circuit used Missouri Valley to overrule United
States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982), in which a panel of
the Court approved such sentences. Gruner, supra note 4, at 23 n.110. Eventually,
all appellate courts that have addressed this issue have found that such sentences
exceeded the FPA. Id. at 23.
87. 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984).
88. Id. at 960. The defendants were charged with violating the Sherman Act
"by conspiring... to reduce or eliminate competition in the promotion of musical
performances." Id. at 961.
1995]
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charities approved by the Probation Department.89 The district
judge had imposed the community service as a probationary condi-
tion to serve "a rehabilitative and deterrent corporate purpose"
which he called "symbolic restitution."90 However, like the Eighth
Circuit, the Third Circuit found that the probationary condition
went beyond the FPA's grant of authority.91
Some district courts and at least one appellate court have ap-
proved some types of alternative sentences under the FPA. For ex-
ample, a district court in New York State required a bakery to
donate baked goods to needy organizations for one year as commu-
nity service.92 The court theorized that the sentence would have a
deterrent effect because employees would be continually reminded
of the violations and the need to prevent reoccurrence.98 In United
States v. Mitsubishi International Corp.,94 the Ninth Circuit approved
suspension of a fine in exchange for the defendant providing an
executive for one year and $10,000 to a community-based outreach
program for ex-offenders. 95 However, the court noted that the
company could choose to pay the fine if it did not like the sus-
pended sentence, pointing out that suspension of sentence under
the FPA was quasi-voluntary. 96
B. Current Sentencing Law
1. Sentencing Reform Act Of 1984
After years of debate and study over the purposes, successes
and failures of federal sentencing philosophy and practice, Con-
gress radically changed the landscape by enacting the Sentencing
89. John Scher, 746 F.2d at 961.
90. Id. at 962.
91. Id. at 963. The court noted, however, that its ruling did not question the
idea that community service could be imposed on organizations in appropriate
cases, despite the difficulty in having businesses perform such service. Id. at 963
n.3.
92. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1167
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
93. Id. at 1167.
94. 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
95. Mitsubishi, 677 F.2d at 787. Unlike Missouri Valley, and other cases, the
defendant did not attack the sentence as exceeding the court's authority under the
FPA. Id. at 788. Instead, the defendant argued that the sentence, in its totality,
exceeded the court's statutory authority under the substantive statute of convic-
tion. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not face a direct FPA challenge to the
court's creative sentence. Id.
96. Id. In other words, the defendant could always choose to accept the origi-
nal sentence imposed, usually a fine. Id.
18
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Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"). 97 Prior to that time, federal law had
emphasized rehabilitation of the defendant as a leading purpose of
sentencing, especially in terms of probation, and gave judges virtu-
ally unfettered discretion in sentencing within statutory limits. The
SRA broadens the goals of sentencing,98 narrows some aspects of
judicial discretion,99 increases the amount of possible organiza-
tional fines'0 0 and explicitly provides for sentences containing wide-
ranging probationary conditions.1 1
The SRA instructs courts to consider the various types of
sentences available and the sentencing range available under guide-
lines developed by the United States Sentencing Commission.
10 2
The Guidelines prescribe the available range of a sentence, thus
limiting ajudge's discretion and informing the defendant and the
public more precisely what the sentence would actually be.10 3 The
SRA also requires judges to be consistent in sentencing, meting out
similar punishments to defendants with similar criminal histories
convicted of similar offenses.
10 4
With regard to organizations, the SRA requires courts to im-
pose probation, a fine, or both; thus, probation is a specific sen-
tence, unlike under the FPA.10 5 The SRA also authorizes criminal
forfeiture, notice to victims and restitution as independent parts of
97. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1988) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86; 18 U.S.C. §§ 991-98).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A)-(D). These goals are to punish, deter and ed-
ucate the defendant and to protect society. Id.
99. Id. § 3553(a) (4)-(6); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (establishing United States Sentenc-
ing Commission).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c). The SRA sets different maximum fines for individu-
als and organizations. Compare id. § 3571(b) with § 3571(c). It also permits courts
to calculate the statutory maximum fine three different ways to select whichever is
greatest: (1) under the substantive offense of conviction; (2) under § 3571(c)
which sets a statutory maximum of $500,000 per count for a felony committed by
an organization; or (3) twice the pecuniary gain realized from the offense by the
defendant or twice the pecuniary loss suffered by another person from the offense
as described in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). Id. § 3571 (c) (1)-(7).
101. Id. §§ 3551 (c) (1), 3561-63.
102. Id. § 3553(a) (4)-(5) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1)-(2)).
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)-(2).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (6). Judges must consider "the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct." Id. These sentencing principles are often re-
ferred to as "determinate sentencing" and "consistency/fairness." Parker, supra
note 3, at 534-41.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c). Courts may impose probation for between one and
five years for a felony and up to five years for a misdemeanor. Id. § 3561. For
felonies, courts must impose a fine, restitution or community service as an express
condition of a probation sentence, unless such a condition would be plainly un-
reasonable. Id. § 3563(a) (2).
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punishment or as conditions of probation.106 Additionally, the SRA
contains specific provisions governing when and for how long pro-
bation may be imposed.10 7 The statute requires imposition of
mandatory conditions of probation. 08 The SRA also authorizes dis-
cretionary conditions which may be imposed, including restitu-
tion,10 9 notice to victims," 0 and a catch-all of "such other
conditions as the court may impose.""' The SRA's legislative his-
tory makes clear that Congress intended this list of potential proba-
tionary conditions to guide courts in imposing probation, not to
restrict their authority to fashion appropriate probationary condi-
tions in specific cases." 2 Thus, the SRA permits more extensive use
of probationary conditions than did the FPA because it has broader
statutory objectives which may be accomplished through use of
probation.
However, in keeping with its stated purpose of limiting judicial
discretion and achieving consistency in sentencing, Congress did
not provide courts with carte blanche probationary authority in the
SRA. Instead, Congress specified that conditions of probation must
bear a "reasonable relationship" to the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and
the four sentencing goals set forth in the SRA: punishment, deter-
rence, protection and rehabilitation."1 Moreover, discretionary
probationary conditions may involve only those deprivations of lib-
erty or property which are necessary to accomplish one or more of
the SRA's goals in sentencing." 4
2. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
To narrow federal judges' wide discretion in imposing punish-
ment, the SRA established the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion ("Commission"), a seven-member independent commission
106. Id. § 3554-56. Criminal forfeiture requires a defendant to forfeit prop-
erty to the United States. Id. § 3554. Notice to victims signifies that defendants
may be required to notify victims and explain the conviction. Id. § 3555. Finally,
restitution may be imposed. Id. § 3556.
107. Id. §§ 3561-63.
108. Id. § 3563(a) (1-3).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (3).
110. Id. § 3563(b) (4).
111. Id. § 3563(b) (22).
112. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3278. "The list is not exhaustive, and it is not intended at all to
limit the court's options - conditions of a nature very similar to, or very different
from, those set forth may also be imposed." Id.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
114. Id.
20
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located within the judicial branch of government.115 Congress au-
thorized the Commission to "establish sentencing policies and prac-
rices for the federal criminal justice system" which would
accomplish the SRA's four statutory goals, promote consistency and
fairness in sentencing, and reflect current knowledge of human be-
havior concerning criminal justice. 116 Congress also instructed the
Commission to develop sentencing guidelines on broad categories
of offenses to be used by participants in the federal criminal justice
system: defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, probation of-
ficers, and judges." 7 Once adopted by the Commission, they
would go into effect unless changed by Congress."18
After developing and issuing sentencing guidelines for individ-
uals convicted of offenses, the Commission turned its attention to
promulgating guidelines for organizational criminal defendants.19
The Commission considered several draft proposals reflecting the
dramatically differing views of corporate punishment. One, drawn
up principally byJeffrey S. Parker, then deputy chief counsel for the
Commission staff, relied primarily on monetary fines as punish-
ment and minimized use of alternative sanctions such as proba-
tion.' 20 This draft represented the economic school of thought
that monetary fines are powerful deterrents, preferable in organiza-
tional sentencing, and cost society less in terms of the loss from the
offense as well as the cost of enforcement and punishment.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The Commission members are appointed pursuant
to § 991(a). Id.
116. Id. § 991(b)(1).
117. Id. § 994. In order to enact guidelines, an affirmative vote by four mem-
bers of the Commission is needed. Id.
118. Id. § 99 4(p). In United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission against
an attack that its placement in the judicial branch violated the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Id. at 367.
119. This caused the Commission to enter a fierce debate concerning how
organizations should be punished for criminal conduct. This discussion has raised
more issues than it has resolved. Depending on the viewpoint of the debater, the
issues include an organization's legal culpability for the acts of individuals, what
punishments deter organizations generally and with the least cost in terms of loss
from the crime plus costs to society for enforcement and punishment, the ability of
organizations to continue in business and operate without undue judicial interfer-
ence, the need for punishment which brings about "real" change in organizational
behavior, and whether fines achieve deterrence and change in organizational be-
havior. See generally Parker, supra note 3; Gruner, supra note 4.
120. United States Sentencing Commission, Discussion Draft of Sentencing
Guidelines & Policy Statements for Organizations, 10 WHrrnnR L. RFv. 7, 19 (1988).
"[T]he approach followed in this draft emphasizes restitution, forfeiture and mon-
etary fines as appropriate and adequate in the majority of cases." Id.
1995] 263
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A competing draft reflected the corporate reformist viewpoint
which proposes that fines often do little to change corporate behav-
ior because organizations pass costs of fines onto stockholders and
consumers. 121 Consequently, the organization and its individual ac-
tors are untouched by the effects of a fine. Their draft advocated
more frequent imposition of probation and other non-monetary
sanctions, even to the point of requiring companies to change in-
ternal practices or perform other tasks under court supervision.' 22
After considerable public discussion, the Commission issued
Chapter Eight of the current Sentencing Guidelines which ex-
empted organizational defendants in environmental cases from the
fine calculation provisions, but subjected them to the restitution,
remediation and probation requirements. 23 While the Commis-
sion did not adopt either viewpoint totally, it accepted many of the
corporate reformist school's arguments, rejecting the idea that im-
position of fines alone should be considered the standard or usual
punishment for organizations. This conclusion is based on an ex-
amination of the Commission's general approach toward organiza-
tional sentencing and its identification of four principles or
objectives, in order of importance, that courts should seek to
achieve via criminal punishment.' 24
In Chapter Eight, the Commission set forth four general prin-
ciples to guide judicial sentencing of corporations, partnerships
and other entities. First and foremost, courts are supposed to order
121. John C. Coffee et al., Standards for Organizational Probation, 10 WHrrrrER
L. REV. 77, 82 (1988).
[A] system of fines may be perceived as amounting to a tariff system that
permits corporations... to engage in criminal behavior so long as they
are prepared to pay the criminal tax.... [T]he aim of the criminal law
... is to prevent the prohibited behavior, not simply raise the cost of
engaging in it.
Id.
122. Id. at 82-83.
123. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8Al.l,
App. n.2 [hereinafter GUIDELINFS].
124. The Commission wrote that:
Organizations can act only through agents and, under federal criminal
law, generally are vicariously liable for offenses committed by their
agents. At the same time, individual agents are responsible for their own
criminal conduct. Federal prosecutions of organizations therefore fre-
quently involve individual and organizational co-defendants .... This
chapter is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations
and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deter-
rence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for
preventing, detecting and reporting criminal conduct.
GumELINEs, supra note 123, at Ch. 8, Introductory Commentary (emphasis added).
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organizations "to remedy any harm caused by the offense." 2 5 Re-
sources used to remedy harm should not be considered punish-
ment, but a means for making the victim whole.126 Second, courts
should divest organizations of their assets via high fines if the de-
fendant operated primarily for a criminal purpose. 127 Third, deter-
mination of fine ranges should be based on the seriousness of the
offense and the organization's culpability.' 28 Finally, imposition of
organizational probation is appropriate when needed to ensure
that another sanction will be implemented or to ensure that the
organization will take internal measures to prevent future criminal
conduct. 29 The Sentencing Commission's emphasis on "remedy-
ing harm" as the first concern of courts rather than determination
of fines, as well as provision for organizational probation, demon-
strates the influence of the corporate reformists on the final version
of Chapter Eight.
The probationary section of Chapter Eight implements the
SRA's expansive authorization of probation. 30 In the Sentencing
Guidelines, the Commission requires courts to order a term of pro-
bation in eight circumstances for periods of up to five years.13'
As Congress did in the SRA, the organizational guidelines spec-
ify that probationary conditions must be reasonably related to the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant. 3 2 Chapter, Eight also incorporates the
SRA's limitation that probationary conditions may be used when
they "involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at Ch. 8, Introductory Commentary.
129. See id.; § 8A1.2, Application Instructions.
130. See id. §§ 8Dl.1 - 8D1.5.
131. The eight circumstance are: (1) to secure payment of restitution, en-
force a remedial order or ensure completion of community service; (2) to secure
payment of a fine if payment is not made in its entirety at the time of sentencing;
(3) when an organization having more than 50 employees at the time of sentenc-
ing does not have an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law; (4)
when the organization engaged in similar adjudicated criminal misconduct within
five years prior to sentencing and the current offense occurred after that adjudica-
tion; (5) when "high-level personnel" of the organization engaged in similar adju-
dicated criminal misconduct within five years of sentencing and the current
offense occurred after adjudication; (6) to ensure that changes are made within
the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct; (7) when a
sentence does not include a fine; and (8) to accomplish one or more of the objec-
tives set forth in the SRA at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) Oust punishment, deterrence,
public protection and rehabilitation). GuIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8DI.1 (a) (1)-
(8).
132. Id. § 8D1.3 (c).
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necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing."133 However, in a
policy statement, the Commission lists "recommended" probation-
ary conditions requiring the organization, among other things, to
publicize the crime and its punishment, to take certain measures to
safeguard payment of any deferred fine, restitution or assessment,
and to develop and implement a program to prevent and detect
violations of law.134 Many of these "recommended" conditions of
probation are not specifically listed in the SRA and are presumably
based on the statute's "catch all" probationary provision.' 3 5 Conse-
quently, Chapter Eight, Subpart D, read as a whole, clearly reflects
that the Sentencing Commission accepted the "corporate reform-
ists" argument that courts may use probationary conditions in a
wide-ranging fashion.
Since adoption of Chapter Eight, the Commission has worked
repeatedly to draft a comprehensive guideline for environmental
organizational defendants. In 1991, it appointed an Advisory
Group consisting of government lawyers from EPA and DOJ, repre-
sentatives of the environmental defense bar and corporate legal
community, and several law professors, including "corporate re-
formist" Professor Coffee. In November of 1993 the Advisory
Group submitted a proposal to the Commission which continued to
emphasize Chapter Eight's use of alternative sanctions. 13 6 To date,
the Commission has not acted on the Advisory Group's proposal.
V. BEPs IN THE CRIMINAL SETTING: ARE THEY LEGAL AND WISE?
The remainder of this Article will identify sources of legal au-
thority for combining fines with BEPs, discuss legal and policy con-
siderations raised through the use of such sanctions, and set forth
basic criteria which should be used to evaluate and implement such
punishment.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 8D1.4.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
136. FrNAL PROPOSAL OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL SANGTIONS
(November, 1993). The Advisory Group's efforts triggered renewed debate con-
cerning how best to sentence organizations. When the Advisory Group put out its
initial draft for public comment, the same forces which had opposed the Chapter 8
guidelines as being too intrusive on business decision making and providing for
overly punitive fines banded together again. Their written comments, as well as
their public testimony on May 10, 1993, before the Advisory Group, demonstrated
their continued preference for "moderate" fines as the primary sanction.
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A. Legal Issues
1. Does the SRA Authorize Sentences Containing BEPs?
In order to be legal, any sentence must fall within the statutory
mandate of the SRA. As noted previously, that statute authorizes
courts to impose a fine, probation or both on organizations in addi-
tion to providing criminal forfeiture, restitution and notice to vic-
tims.1 37 Consequently, a sentence requiring performance of a BEP
must fall within one of these categories.
a. Criminal forfeiture and notice to victims
These aspects of sentencing have expanded ajudge's authority
at sentencing; however, they do not provide a court with authority
to sentence an organization to perform BEPs.
b. Restitution
Restitution traditionally has been a civil remedy designed to
prevent a wrongdoer from retaining any benefits illegally obtained
from another and to make the victim whole for damages. The
SRA's inclusion of restitution as a specific part of criminal sentenc-
ing follows on the FPA's similar provision and that found in the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.138
In the environmental setting, restitution may be appropriate in
several different instances. For example, restitution may be im-
posed in order to have the defendant reimburse a third party for
costs incurred in remediating harm caused by the illegal act, such
as the stereotypical "midnight dumping" of hazardous waste or
other pollutants. Such costs may be incurred by the EPA, state or
local regulatory agencies, or private parties.'3 9
Restitution may also be viewed as the legal basis for having de-
fendants restore parts of the environment actually damaged by the
offense, such as re-creating wetlands destroyed by illegal discharges.
Since the defendant may be liable civilly for such restoration, inclu-
sion of such a sanction as part of the criminal sentence obviates the
need for a duplicative civil enforcement actions to obtain restitu-
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(c), 3554-56. Section 3555 provides that "notice may
be ordered to be given by mail, by advertising... or by other appropriate means."
Id. § 3555.
138. Id. § 3663. For a discussion of the development of restitution as a crimi-
nal rather than a civil sanction, see L. Lavenue, The Corporation As A Criminal De-
fendant and Restitution As A Criminal Remedy: Application of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act By The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, 18 IOWAJ. CoRP.
L. 441 (1993).
139. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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don or remediation. More ephemerally, remediation of environ-
mental harm can be viewed as making "the environment" or the
general public whole - in other words, treating the environment or
society as the "victim" deserving of restitution. 140 Consequently, in
appropriate cases, courts may impose BEPs as restitution, such as in
the Exxon and Hartford Associates cases previously discussed.
c. Conditions of probation
The SRA's authorization of wide-ranging conditions of proba-
tion contains the broadest legal bases for BEPs, particularly those
which exceed existing legal requirements or obligations. While
most of the explicitly listed conditions in the SRA are worded to
apply to individuals, several may require BEPs. 141 First, courts may
impose community service as a condition of probation in addition
to a fine or restitution and must impose it if the sentence does not
include a fine or restitution. 142 This brings up a fundamental ques-
tion: what is community service in the organizational setting and
how can ajudge make it meaningful, both in terms of the defend-
ant and the community?143
Under the FPA, courts imposed community service on organi-
zations in spite of inherent problems in having a fictional "person"
perform such activities. Despite striking down the specific charita-
ble contribution community service provision in John Scher, the
Third Circuit succinctly noted the value of community service in
general.144 "Such sentences require that the defendant become
personally involved - devoting both time and energy - in a project
140. The question of who or what is the "victim" in environmental criminal
cases is outside the scope of this article. However, sentences which include restitu-
tion that goes to trusts or third parties purportedly acting in the public interest,
rather than a person or organization which had incurred measurable costs in ad-
dressing the harm caused by the offense or who suffered direct loss, seem to be
attempting to make "the environment" or "the public" whole.
This approach is consistent with Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), which addressed the metaphysical question of whether
"the environment" had legal standing. Id. at 742 (DouglasJ, dissenting). Accord-
ing to justice Douglas, the environment should be considered a "person" for stand-
ing purposes. He compared the environment to a corporation, which has been
held to be a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory process. Id.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a).
142. Id. § 3563(a) (2).
143. The purpose of giving community service as a condition of probation
must be to rehabilitate the probationer, deter future misconduct, provide a gen-
eral deterrence of others or be deserved punishment. John Scher, 746 F.2d at 962.
In the corporation, however, community service must be formatted so that the
corporate managers and employees will alter their behavior. Id. at 963.
144. Id.
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that serves the public interest, and thereby inculcate in the defend-
ant a sense of social responsibility."'145
In environmental cases where the defendant was sentenced
under the FPA, courts occasionally imposed community service as a
condition of probation. In United States v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,' 4 6
a pesticide prosecution in Virginia, the court required the defend-
ant to perform 2000 hours of community service and suspended
$150,000 of the $500,000 fine. 47 In United States v. Nanticoke Homes,
Inc.,' 48 a Delaware hazardous waste case, the court fined the com-
pany $300,000, and required it to perform 400 hours of community
service. The court further required corporate officers, members of
the family that owned the company, to perform twenty-five percent
of the community service hours. 49 Unlike the district court in John
Scher, these judges left the details of the community service to the
discretion and judgment of the Probation Department.
Today, section 8B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes
imposition of community service as a probationary condition when
it is "reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the of-
fense."150 In Chapter Eight, the Sentencing Commission notes that
"where the convicted organization possesses knowledge, facilities,
or skills that uniquely qualify it to repair damage caused by the of-
fense, community service directed at repairing damage may provide
an efficient means of remedying harm caused."15' Thus, as long as
145. Id. The Third Circuit acknowledged the particular problems presented
by imposing community service on organizations, but refused to bar such
sentences. Id. at 963 n.3. The legislative history of the SRA also shows that Con-
gress approves of the use of community service.
The provision is intended.., to encourage continued experimentation
with community service as an appropriate condition in some cases ....
This condition might prove especially useful in a case in which the impo-
sition of a fine or restitution is not appropriate, either because of the
defendant's inability to pay or because the victims cannot be readily iden-
tified or the actual amount of injury is slight.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281.
Congress may have had in mind environmental prosecutions involving pollution
which has dissipated by the time of sentencing or which can not be remedied di-
rectly when it described the appropriate use of community service.
146. United States v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 88-00040 (W.D. Va. 1988)
(unreported) (on file with author).
147. See id.
148. United States v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., No. 91-23 LON (D. Del. 1981
(unreported) (on file with author).
149. See id.
150. GuIDELMNS, supra note 123, § 8B1.3.
151. Id. § 8B1.3, comment. However, the commentary also states that "an or-
ganization can perform community service only by employing its resources or pay-
ing its employees or others to do so. Consequently, an order that an organization
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the BEP reasonably repairs the harm caused by the offense, a court
should be able to require a defendant to perform such a project as
a form of community service. This will, of course, require an assess-
ment of what is the harm and how it can be repaired. In the envi-
ronmental setting, these questions can become complicated fairly
quickly.
Nevertheless, the concept of community service is useful when
considering having a defendant perform BEPs, particularly those
which require the organization to perform tasks not otherwise le-
gally required. 52 Such BEPs could include general pollution pre-
vention or reduction activities which fail outside the restitution or
remedial order provisions of the Guidelines. 153 However, commu-
nity service may not be used to funnel funds or services to third-
party groups not affected by the offense. 54 The Sentencing Com-
mission, perhaps mindful of past cases under the FPA, has specifi-
cally forbidden use of community service to endow university
faculty positions or fund local charities "unless such community ser-
vice provided a means for preventive or corrective action directly
related to the offense and therefore served one of the purposes of
sentencing."155
The second applicable condition of probation is the catch-all
"such other conditions as the court may impose." 56 The SRA's leg-
islative history supports use of this provision to fashion probation-
ary conditions not specifically listed in the statute. 5 7 According to
the statute's legislative history, "(t) he list is not exhaustive, and it is
perform community service is essentially an indirect monetary sanction, and there-
fore generally less desireable than a direct monetary sanction." Id.
152. Using community service to make organizational sentencing more mean-
ingful has been a favorite suggestion of the "corporate reformists." See Brent Fisse,
Community Service As A Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. R-v. 970 (1981).
153. Id. at 974. For example, in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. I.R.S., 40 Env't Rep. Cas
(BNA) 1660 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 1995), instead of imposing a $13.24 million fine, the
court allowed the fine to be reduced if Allied signal established the Virginia Envi-
ronmental Endowment, a corporation created to improve the overall quality of the
environment. Id.
154. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8B1.3 comment.
155. Id. It must serve the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (a).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (22).
157. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.S.C.A.N. 3278. The conditions "are simply designed to provide the trial court
with a suggested listing of one of the available alternatives which might be desire-
able in the sentencing of a particular offender. It is anticipated that .... the court
will review the listed examples ... weigh other possibilities suggested by the case,
and, after evaluation, impose those that appear to be appropriate under all the
circumstances." Id.
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not intended at all to limit the court's options - conditions of a na-
ture very similar to, or very different from, those set forth may also
be imposed."' 58
The Sentencing Commission presumably uses the catch-all pro-
vision, along with the explicit statutory authority for restitution, as
its legal basis when it instructs judges in Chapter Eight that their
first concern at sentencing should be to impose remedial orders, as
conditions of probation, to "remedy the harm caused by the offense
and to eliminate or reduce the isk" of future harm, including the
creation of trust funds "to address that expected harm".159 The
Commission does not cite any statutory authority for this provision;
however, the Commentary to section 8B1.2 cites environmental
cleanup as one situation subject to remedial action.' 60
The SRA and the organizational sentencing guidelines clearly
authorize courts to impose BEPs on defendants as conditions of
probation in order to "repair" or "remedy" the harm caused by the
offense or eliminate or reduce the future risk of harm.' 6' However,
such BEPs must fulfill the statutory requirement that courts impose
probationary conditions which are "reasonably related" to the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteris-
tics of the defendant, and the sentencing goals of the SRA, and only
involve deprivations of liberty or property when are "reasonably
necessary" to accomplish Congress's sentencing goals.' 62
When correctly developed, BEPs satisfy all these criteria. First,
a BEP focused on environmental harm generally caused by the of-
fense will be "reasonably related" to the offense. 165 Second, respon-
sible prosecutors and judges will assess the BEP in light of the
defendants' history and characteristics, particularly their ability to
158. Id. However, the court may not impose a condition of probation which
results in a deprivation of liberty, unless that deprivation is "reasonably necessary"
in carrying out the purpose of the sentence. Id.
159. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8B1.2.
160. Id. If remedial action is ordered, the appropriate governmental agency
may have authority to coordinate the remedial cleanup. Id.
161. Id.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). For the factors which the court must take into ac-
count to determine what is "reasonably related" and "reasonably necessary," see
supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. In a case highly reminiscent of the
FPA line of decisions, the Third Circuit ruled in United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d
1318 (3d Cir. 1993), that the Sentencing Reform Act did not authorize courts to
order a defendant to donate money to a charity as part of a sentence. Id. at 1330.
The defendant was convicted of child pornography, and the trial court had or-
dered him to donate $5,000 to a local anti-pornography organization. Id.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
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undertake and implement a BEP.'6 More than would the mere
payment of a fine, these projects will help achieve Congress' goals
in sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, public protection, and
rehabilitation.165 BEPs provide ajust punishment for the offense if
they are related to the nature of the offense and the harm created.
Furthermore, BEPs will deter the defendant as well as others be-
cause they demonstrate that punishment will not be limited to
merely "writing a check." BEPs will also protect the public against
future crimes because of their deterrent value; hopefully BEPs will
self-educate and rehabilitate the defendant.
2. Congressional "Power of the Purse" Restrictions
Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, Con-
gress has the "power of the purse."166 This power may affect BEPs
in several ways, depending in large part on how an alternative sanc-
tion is structured.167
a. The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute
Among its thousands of pages, the United States Code contains
a paragraph almost mythically referred to in government circles as
the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute ("MRS").168 This obscure provi-
sion often is cited by the Comptroller General or others who vigor-
ously guard the flow of money into and out of the federal
Treasury. 169 They claim that the MRS generally prevents the
164. Id. § 3553(a) (1).
165. Id. § 3553(a) (2).
166. U.S. CONss. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
167. For a general discussion of Congress' power of the purse, see K. Stith,
Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
168. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 11, 9 Stat. 398 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1982)). 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) provides: "[e]xcept as provided in
section 3718(b) of this title, an official or agent of the Government receiving
money for the Government from any source shall deposit the money in the Treas-
ury as soon as practicable without deduction for any charges or claim."
169. EPA and the Comptroller General ("CG") have sparred over whether the
MRS bars EPA's use of SEP's in enforcement cases, thanks in part to Congressional
inquiries. In response to such an inquiry from CongressmanJohn Dingell in 1991,
the CG issued an opinion stating that EPA could not settle Clean Air Act ("CAA")
enforcement actions concerning the mobile source regulatory program by having
the violator perform public awareness programs. Comptroller General Opinion,
No. B-247155 (July 7, 1992). When EPA refused to change its position that such
settlements were legal, the Congressman again asked the CG for an opinion. The
CG complied and issued a second opinion. See Comptroller General Opinion, No.
B-247155.2 (March 1, 1993). The CG again noted that the Agency's authority did
not extend to remedies unrelated to the violation. Id.
The CG's opinions are not necessarily binding on the Executive Branch be-
cause the CG is an employee of the legislative branch of government. Bowsher v.
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United States from "giving up" higher monetary sanctions in ex-
change for alternative sanctions, particularly when a third party is
receiving funds allegedly in lieu of a federal monetary punish-
ment. 70 Simply put, the MRS mandates that money owed to the
federal government, must be deposited in the Treasury upon
receipt.' 7 '
Attorneys can avoid any restrictions imposed by the MRS by
properly structuring a plea agreement and sentence. Federal envi-
ronmental statutes and Title 18 generally authorize imposition of a
criminal fine "up to" a daily maximum per day of violation 172 or per
count,' 73 not a pre-determined specific amount. Determination of
the specific amount is left to the informed judgment of the
court. 174 Consequently, it seems logical that criminal punishment
triggers the MRS, if at all, only when the court makes a final deter-
mination as to the actual amount of the fine portion of the total
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (finding Congressional removal powers of CG and
separation of powers prevents CG from functioning as part of executive branch).
The CG's focus on the relationship between the violation and the SEP differs little
from the appellate courts' rulings in FPA cases and the SRA's requirement that
probationary conditions be reasonably related to the offense.
170. In Re Commodity Futures Trading Commission, B-210210 (Sept. 14,
1983), 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (1990). The judiciary also expressed concerns in Mis-
sowri Valley, about potential monetary diversions in cases sentenced under the FPA:
We note also that the effect of the monetary-payment conditions of pro-
bation in this case is to transfer to a private entity designated by the dis-
trict court a substantial sum of money that would otherwise likely have
gone, in the form of a fine, into the federal treasury. The appropriation
of federal treasury funds is ordinarily a legislative function.... [W] e are
reluctant to hold that Congress ... delegated to the courts the power to
allocate funds otherwise collectible as fines to any persons other than
those expressly mentioned in the statute - that is, to aggrieved persons
who have suffered actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which
conviction was had, and to persons for whose support the defendant is
legally responsible.
Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1549-50.
A related concern involves federal agencies trying to supplement their activi-
ties without congressional appropriation. The CG cited this concern when exam-
ining EPA's SEP practices under the CAA. See Comptroller General Opinion, B-
247155, supra note 169.
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b).
172. See, e.g., CWA § 309(c) (1)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1)-(3). The criminal
penalties section of the CWA provides for: "a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more
than $25,000 per day of violation" if there is a negligent violation of the statute, "a
fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation" for a'
knowing violation of the statute, and "a fine of not more than $250,000" for know-
ing endangerment. Id.
173. See, e.g., CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c). The CAA provides punish-
ment with fines "pursuant to title 18." Id.
174. See, e.g., CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
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punishment, and that payment of the fine amount satisfies the
MRS.
b. Augmentation of Budgets and Anti-Deficiency Act
The MRS is intended to prevent federal agencies from spend-
ing money for their own causes by requiring it to be deposited in
the Treasury for use as Congress directs. 175 BEPs which act to sup-
plement the budget or resources of a federal agency may run afoul
of this fiscal limitation. For example, the Comptroller General
("CG") has opined several times that enforcement settlements or
other agreements which reduce the amount of penalties or other
fees going to the Treasury in exchange for university research or
similar activities act to augment agency budgets and are illegal. 176
This logic may be tenuous but it has casued federal agencies to dis-
tance themselves from this type of agreement. 77
The Anti-Deficiency Act addresses a related concern. 178 It pro-
hibits executive branch employees from spending money in excess
of amounts available through Congressional appropriations or obli-
gating the federal government to pay money prior to appropriation
by Congress. 79 This statute may come into play when a defendant
establishes a trust fund involving money which arguably would have
gone to the federal Treasury as a fine and which is so heavily influ-
enced or controlled by government employees for public benefit
that it really is a governmental rather than private entity. Govern-
ment employees are thus spending unappropriated money for fed-
eral government purposes. As discussed below, some trust funds
created pursuant to plea agreements have utilized government em-
ployees, acting in their public role, as decision makers.'80 This ar-
rangement brings the Anti-Deficiency Act into play and should be
avoided. Trust funds should be controlled by independent third
175. Stith, supra note 167, at 1364. The MRS ensures that executive agencies
do not obligate public funds to activities except in the amounts appropriated by
Congress. Id.
176. See e.g., In re Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 70 Comp. Gen. 17
(1990).
177. See, e.g., Original SEP Policy, supra note 25 at 10.
178. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1484 § 4, 33 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-51 (1982)).
179. Id. § 1341. The limitation provides: "[an officer... may not - (A) make
or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an
appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or (B) involve either gov-
emment in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropri-
ation is made ...." Id. § 1341(a) (1).
180. See generally Burnett Plea Agreement, supra note 43.
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parties, not federal government employees acting within the scope
of their professional duties.
c. Crime Victims Fund
By law, most criminal fines must be deposited into a special
account in the Department of the Treasury known as the Crime
Victims Fund ("Fund"). 18' The money is used to pay for victim
compensation and assistance programs. Consequently, once a fine
has been imposed by a court, that money must go to the Fund to
benefit victims of crime.' 82
The Fund legislation presents the same problem as that en-
countered with the MRS: alleged diversion of money owed to the
United States. As with the MRS, attorneys and judges may avoid
this obstacle simply by carefully delineating the amount which is a
fine, and that which is restitution or some other form of sanction
imposed by the court. The fine amount must be paid to the Treas-
ury like any other fine, and will be deposited into the Fund.183
3. Trust Funds/Third-Paty Beneficiaries
Prosecutors have used both statutorily-created and ad hoc trust
funds controlled by third parties to obtain money for environmen-
tally-related projects. While the projects paid for by such funds and
the underlying criminal conduct have been related, the amount of
direct linkage between the harm and the actual offensive conduct
has varied.
Provisions authorizing federal trust funds or the acceptance of
gifts exist throughout the United States Code. The North Ameri-
can Wetlands Conservation Fund'84 has been used in at least one
case to receive money provided by criminal defendants. For exam-
ple, in the Alaskan Exxon oil spill prosecution, the defendants paid
$12 million of the ultimate $25 million fine to the Fund for use by
the Department of the Interior "to carry out approved wetlands
conservation projects in the United States, Canada and Mexico."'8
181. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b). Congress has exempted some fines which go by
law into other statutorily created funds. Id. § 10601(b) (1). For example, fines im-
posed in connection with oil spills or endangered species violations go into the
accounts dedicated for other purposes. Id. § 10601(b) (1) (A)-(B).
182. Id. § 10601(b).
183. Id. § 10601 (a).
184. Pub. L. No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 1977 (1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 4401-13).
185. See generally Exxon Plea Agreement, supra note 35.
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However, a different situation occurs when the defendant
agrees to create a trust fund as part of its criminal sentence. Pay-
ments into a trust fund are usually labeled as restitution to avoid
Crime Victim Fund and MRS problems, and have been used for
wide-ranging purposes. For example, in the Burnett wetlands case
in Washington State, the defendants will pay $150,000 in restitution
into a trust fund created as part of the sentence. Trust representa-
tives, personnel from municipal and federal agencies and a local
land trust have final authority on how to spend the fund to "pre-
serve, protect and restore wetlands" in the Battle Ground, Washing-
ton area for citizens' benefit.'8 6
Trusts created as part of the sentence and funded by defend-
ants' payments resemble charitable contributions selected by the
parties or the courts which were struck down by appellate courts
under the FPA. Besides purely legal concerns, the appellate courts
believed that such selective funding of charities or other good
causes embroiled judges in matters best left to others. The Fourth
Circuit expressed such concern in an anti-trust prosecution:
Creative sentencing of the kind here undertaken ... nec-
essarily involves the court in selecting particular third per-
sons to become beneficiaries of the probationer's assets -
presumably acting in some way as "surrogates" for the pub-
lic as the actually 'aggrieved party' ..... Where the sums
imposed for payment are also fixed by the court without
reference to any measurable losses or damage, the court
exposes itself to possibly justifiable and unanswerable criti-
cisms both in respect of the particular beneficiaries se-
lected and the specific sums awarded them. The danger
thereby created, without compensating benefit, for unnec-
essary involvement of the criminal justice system in periph-
eral controversy is obvious.18 7
Despite these concerns, the Sentencing Commission autho-
rizes courts to create trust funds as part of a criminal sentence. 18 8
Section 8B1.2(b) of the Guidelines permits judges to create trust
186. Burnett Plea Agreement, supra note 43, at 2.
187. United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir.
1984). See also Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1550 (stating "courts are ill-equipped to
pick and choose, among countess worthy causes, which nonaggrieved charitable
organizations should receive large sums of money that would otherwise be paid to
the treasury as fines.").
188. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8B1.2(b).
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funds to address "expected harm" when the court can "reasonably
estimate" the magnitude of the future harm. 189
Trust funds may be appropriate in certain cases, especially
when they are statutorily created, but creation of ad hoc entities
presents several problems which must be taken into consideration.
First, as the courts discussed in the FPA line of cases, court selection
or approval of funding of specific charities or good causes may lead
to appearance of impropriety problems.190 Thus, the trust and its
goals must be tied as directly as possible to the harm caused by the
offense. Second, in terms of logistics, creation of trusts as part of
the plea will place additional resource demands on lawyers on both
sides in drafting and reviewing acceptable trust documents. This
will complicate and likely delay resolution of cases. Finally, lawyers
and judges should be concerned with who controls the trusts and
their liability for such activity. Normally, third parties will control
the fund's activities, and the court must be shown that these indi-
viduals are the right people for the job. However, the individuals
must ensure that their participation does not create "power of the
purse problems" by transforming the fund into a federal activity us-
ing unappropriated federal funds.
B. Policy Issues
If BEPs are-legal, there remain several public policy issues
which must be addressed in evaluating the oveall utility of this sen-
tencing approach. The following questions about BEPs have merit,
but the problems they present may be overcome by continued ef-
forts to integrate criminal environmental prosecutions into the fed-
eral government's overall regulatory program as well as increasing
communication among government employees pursuing similar
goals.
1. Do BEPs Duplicate Civil Enforcement?
Persons involved in criminal and civil enforcement often draw
a "bright line" distinction between each of those roles in environ-
mental regulation. Prosecutors and criminal investigators generally
seek to punish the guilty and deter others from similar activity.
Broader regulatory objectives, such as technology-based injunctive
relief or remedial cleanup, are generally left to civil enforce-
189. Id. § 8B1.3.
190. See generally Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d 1550; Wright Contracting, 728 F.2d
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ment.' 9 ' This approach is based in part on traditional distinctions
in American criminal and civil law, on a pragmatic appreciation for
the complexity of environmental law, and on most criminal justice
system participants' lack of expertise in compliance and clean-up
standards and measures. Therefore, as some will claim, BEPs which
impose existing legal requirements on the defendant, or which in-
corporate traditional civil remedies, may duplicate existing civil
remedy mechanisms and intrude on the regulatory system set up by
Congress. 9 2
These are valid concerns, and care must be taken to ensure
that BEPs fit within the overall environmental regulatory program.
However, Congress has already blurred the line between criminal
and civil punishment by explicitly providing for imposition of resti-
tution as part of the criminal sentence. The Sentencing Commis-
sion has taken this a step further by making remedying of harm the
first priority of courts at sentencing, either in the form of commu-
nity service or remedial orders. 193 Consequently, the "bright line"
distinction between criminal and civil enforcement has-already be-
come shadowy. Communication between the government's crimi-
nal enforcement and regulatory personnel can lead to the
development of meaningful BEPs which fit into, rather than dis-
turb, the overall environmental regulatory scheme and an agency's
priorities. The Sentencing Commission has underscored the im-
portance of communication by directing courts to "coordinate" re-
medial orders with administrative or civil actions taken by
regulatory agencies.' 94
When BEPs include remedial actions flowing directly from the
illegal conduct, a related concern arises. In the federal system, the
191. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (permanent or temporary injunctions in
civil enforcement) with § 1319(c) (fines and/or imprisonment in criminal
enforcement).
192. Wray, supra note 2, at 2038. Wray used a similar argument with the intro-
duction of probation into the corporation sentencing guidelines. Id. A primary
issue with BEPs is: what can they accomplish that cannot already be achieved
through other channels? Id. In comparison, Wray argues that probation is redun-
dant because administrative and civil processes have two advantages: (1) a court
lacks the resources to monitor the company's compliance with the regulation as
would the administrative agency; and (2) the judge has little guidance as to which
corporate operations fall within the oversight authority." Id. at 2039. This argu-
ment is equally applicable to the institution of BEPs, and may be addressed in a
similar fashion.
193. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, §§ 8B1.2, 8B1.3.
194. Id. § 8B1.2, comment. Either the court or the appropriate regulatory
agency may order remedial measures, but "if a remedial order is entered, it should
be coordinated with any administrative or civil actions taken by the appropriate
governmental regulatory agency." Id.
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Attorney General has plenary authority to investigate and prosecute
criminal violations of the nation's environmental laws and to settle
such cases. 195 However, in environmental civil actions, EPA de-
cides when to seek civil judicial relief and asks the Department of
Justice to represent it in federal court.196 Additionally, EPA has ad-
ministrative enforcement authority totally independent of the
Department ofJustice. 197 The remedies sought in civil and admin-
istrative cases generally are selected and approved by the agency.198
In some instances, criminal defendants wish to resolve all liabil-
ity arising out of the same conduct, and the United States enters
into both criminal and civil settlements. These are referred to as
"global settlements," and often involve different enforcement ac-
tions involving different government personnel. For example, a
company may be guilty of violating federal pretreatment standards
by discharging excessive concentrations of pollutants to the local
sewage plant. The company might need to install an improved
waste water treatment system to comply with the discharge limits. A
global settlement involving the company could include a guilty plea
with criminal punishment and a civil consent decree containing in-
junctive relief. The civil action could also resolve civil penalty mat-
ters for violations not covered in the guilty plea.
BEPs which incorporate remedies that normally would result
from administrative or civil judicial enforcement tread a fine line
between punishing the guilty and intruding on the regulatory agen-
195. United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274 (1911). In Morgan, the Supreme
Court held that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce the criminal
laws and that this authority is not diminished without a "clear and unambiguous
expression of the legislative will." Id. at 282. See also United States v. Orkin Exter-
minating Co., 688 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W.D. Va. 1988) (EPA's delegation of regula-
tory authority under federal pesticide statute to Commonwealth of Virginia did not
divest Attorney General of criminal prosecutorial authority, absent specific declara-
tion by Congress). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (reserving litigation to Department of
Justice); Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Attorney General has plenary power over all litigation involving the United States
and its agencies absent Congressional directive).
196. See, e.g., CWA § 506, 33 U.S.C. § 1366 (the "Administrator shall request
the Attorney General to appear and represent the United States in any civil or
criminal action instituted under this chapter."); CAA § 305, 42 U.S.C. § 7605 (At-
torney General represents United States in civil actions under this chapter).
197. CWA § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). The Administrator may assess pen-
alties and demand payment for violation of the Act. Id. However, if the violator
fails to pay the penalty, the Administrator must request the Attorney General to
bring a civil action. Id. § 1319(g) (9). See also RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)
(Administrator may order civil penalties, immediate compliance, or may com-
mence a civil action against a violator); CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (Administra-
tor may commence a civil action for recovery).
198. See, e.g., CWA § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
1995]
37
Harrell: Organizational Environmental Crime and the Sentencing Reform Act
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
280 VIuANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VI: p. 243
cies' authority. Prosecutors should consult early with regulatory
agencies about the wisdom and practicality of implementing the
BEP in the criminal setting versus the regulatory environment. If
the defendant seeks a release from civil liability in exchange for the
BEP rather than merely incorporating the civil injunctive or reme-
dial action in the criminal sentence, civil enforcement personnel
from the appropriate regulatory agency and/orJustice Department
must be brought into negotiations because federal prosecutors lack
authority to provide such releases in a criminal plea agreement. 199
At some point, a defendant's desire for finality and the differences
between criminal and civil actions may prevent BEPs from being
included in the criminal sentence.
2. Do BEPs Increase Overall Societal Costs For Offenses?
The "economic" advocates in criminal sentencing no doubt
will argue that BEPs, particularly those which exceed existing legal
requirements, increase the total or final cost to society of the of-
fense and should be avoided. It is true that supervising a defendant
perform specific tasks will consume more governmental and private
resources than merely writing and processing a check.
However, many situations exist where inclusion of BEPs will be
cost-efficient. If the BEP merely incorporates regulatory or clean-
up obligations stemming from the illegal act, the sentence will save
time and effort by negating the need of the regulatory agency to
undertake a civil enforcement action for compliance or remedial
action. This will save agency and judicial resources, as well as pri-
vate resources expended in responding to or defending against the
civil action. When a BEP requires the defendant to undertake sup-
plemental action, the additional costs must be weighed against the
benefits. BEPs should have a positive impact on the environment,
ideally promoting pollution prevention and risk reduction.
3. Do BEPs Unduly Complicate the Criminal Justice System?
It is fair to say that most federal judges and probation officers
are ill-equipped to deal with anything but the most basic BEPs.
Consequently, they should receive assistance from an environmen-
tal regulatory agency. This will increase the societal costs associated
with oversight, but will ensure that the projects which are under-
199. The environmental statutes generally talk in terms of the Administrator
of EPA commencing administrative or civil judicial actions, not the Attorney Gen-
eral. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), (g); RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a).
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taken are productive and performed properly. Regulatory agency
assistance should be available if the BEP is effective and the regula-
tory agency believes it advances environmental protection. If, after
reviewing a proposed BEP, the regulatory agency is not convinced
of the overall merit of the proposal, the parties should seriously
question the value of going forward with it. Recognizing the lack of
expertise of the criminal justice system in various areas, the Sen-
tencing Commission has endorsed consultation with regulatory
agencies in several areas such as remedial orders and probationary
conditions. 200
4. BEPs Are Consistent With and Will Help Achieve the
Nation's Environmental Goals
According to Congress, pollution prevention is a national
goal,20 1 and it is one of the leading themes of environmental regu-
lation today.202 The individual federal environmental statutes also
contain Congressional goals and objectives sought to be achieved
by the legislation.203 These goals should be incorporated into pun-
ishment of those convicted of environmental crime whenever
feasible.
VI. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING AND DEVELOPING BEPs IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
EPA's experience with SEPs, case law developed under the
FPA, and provisions of the SRA and Chapter Eight of the federal
sentencing guidelines provide criteria which prosecutors, judges
and defense attorneys should use in fashioning BEPs for criminal
cases against corporations, partnerships and other organizational
defendants.
200. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8B1.2, comment.
201. The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 provides that, "[t]he Congress
hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that pollution
should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible; pollution that
cannot be prevented should be recycled in an environmentally safe manner, when-
ever feasible." 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b).
202. POLLUTION PREVENTION PoLIcY STATEMENT, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTEcTION (EPA, June 15, 1993).
203. See CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (objective of the CWA is to restore
and maintain the integrity of water supply); CAA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(b) (CAA's purpose is to protect and enhance air quality); RCRA § 1002, 42
U.S.C. § 6902 (objective is to protect health and environment by conservation of
energy and elimination of generation of hazardous waste); TSCA § 2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (objective is to protect health and environment by regulating toxic
substances).
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A. There Must Be a Reasonable Relationship Between The BEP
and The Goals of the Sentencing Reform Act
Appellate courts have struck down creative probationary
sentences under the FPA because they did not bear a reasonable
relationship to the public protection and rehabilitative goals of the
statute.204 Under the SRA and the Chapter 8 organizational guide-
lines, courts may impose probationary conditions which "involve
only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably nec-
essary for the purposes" of sentencing.20 5
Each BEP must be designed to achieve at least one of the SRA's
sentencing objectives: punishment, deterrence, protection or reha-
bilitation.20 6 Since all of the objectives are equally important in
Congress' eyes, a BEP which achieves deterrence is just as valid as
one which furthers rehabilitation. For example, clean up of pollu-
tion resulting from an illegal activity clearly falls within the just pun-
ishment and rehabilitation goals of the SRA, and hopefully serves as
a deterrent to the defendant and other potential environmental
criminals. 20 7 BEPs requiring defendants to reduce or prevent pol-
lution beyond existing legal requirements similarly satisfy the pun-
ishment, rehabilitation and deterrence goals of the SRA.208
Whether such sanctions are necessary to achieve the SRA's
goals presents more of a philosophical than legal question reflect-
ing the continued debate over how best to punish organizations
generally for criminal behavior. Economic advocates generally be-
lieve that such non-monetary sanctions are not necessary to achieve
Congressional objectives while the corporate reformist advocates
likely will support BEPs as necessary to achieve meaningful punish-
ment, deterrence, protection and rehabilitation. The necessity
question may ultimately turn on the participants' personal views on
how to punish organizational defendants, particularly in the envi-
ronmental crime setting.
204. Gruner, supra note 4, at 23 n.112.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). Probationary conditions may be imposed if such
deprivations of liberty or property are necessary to effect the purposes of sentenc-
ing. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8D1.3(c).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2).
207. Id. § 3553(a) (2) (A)-(B).
208. Id.
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B. The BEP Must Be Reasonably Related to The Nature and
Circumstances of The Offense and Must Reasonably
Repair or Remedy Harm Caused by The Offense
The SRA requires the court to take the nature and circum-
stances of the offense into account at sentencing.20 9 Additionally,
the SRA, Chapter Eight of the organizational guidelines, and EPA's
SEP policy require that the project address the harm caused by the
offense.2 10 Appellate courts rejected sentences under the FPA be-
cause the punishment, often charitable contributions, was not
designed to remedy the harm directly if charitable contributions
went to parties which had not been harmed.211
The primary question raised by these requirements is how
much of a direct relationship (or "nexus" to use EPA's phrase)
must exist between the offense and the BEP. Chapter Eight of the
Sentencing Guidelines authorizes courts to impose remedial
projects, community service or other probationary conditions to
remedy or repair the harm caused or anticipated to be caused by an
offense.21 2 The Commission's examples generally refer to remedia-
tion of direct harm such as clean up of a specific area harmed by
illegal disposal of hazardous substances.213
However, many environmental offenses, particularly those in-
volving water or air pollution, do not lend themselves to direct re-
medial action because of the transient nature of these resources. In
contrast to the static nature of soil, water and air continually move
and transport pollution from one area to another. This movement
often also results in dissipation or dilution of pollution. Because
the contamination may occur elsewhere or may be dissipated by the
time the offense is discovered and prosecuted, the illegal discharge
of pollutants into a waterway or the excess emissions of contami-
nants into the atmosphere are not so easily remedied by direct ac-
tion taken at the specific site of the illegal activity.
Judges should apply the SRA and Chapter Eight broadly and in
tandem with the "reasonable relationship" criterion to impose BEPs
209. Id. § 3553(a) (1).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2); U.S.S.G., § 8B1.2-.3; Original SEP Policy, supra
note 25, at 1.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318 (3d Cir. 1993) (striking
dbwn sentence imposed under SRA which required defendant convicted of child
pornography to donate $5,000 to anti-pornography organization). The Govern-
ment conceded that the lower court had erred when it imposed the charitable
contribution condition. Id. at 1330.
212. GumELINES, supra note 123, §§ 8B1.2, 8B1.3.
213. Id. § 8B1.2, comment.
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involving similar types of pollution and harm as the underlying of-
fense, but which may not be focused on the specific site of illegal
conduct, or which involve other types of pollution at or near the
site of a violation. For example, an illegal discharge of pollutants
under the Clean Water Act into the Delaware River may not be ca-
pable of direct remedial action because the sheer volume of water
present in the river has diluted and transported the pollutants away.
However, acting via a BEP, a defendant could take action to protect
the same river or watershed area by reducing permitted discharges
from other facilities into the river or taking clean-up action at other
portions of the waterway.214
The Norwood air pollution case exemplifies this type of BEP.
There, the defendant emitted excess VOC emissions into the air in
a geographical region which has chronic problems with ozone, a
pollutant resulting from VOC and other emissions such as car ex-
hausts. The BEPs negotiated by the parties and imposed by the
court required the company to perform research to reduce VOC
generation at that facility, a form of pollution prevention. This re-
quirement was directly related to the harm caused by the offense.
However, the sentence also required the company to reduce the
amount of atmospheric pollution generated by employees' com-
muting by reducing their number of work days each week. This was
another form of pollution prevention, one tied to the ultimate con-
sequence of VOC emissions (the formation of ozone), but which is
not aimed directly at VOCs or the facility itself. Norwood's agree-
ment to move hazardous waste storage inside rather than outside
involved a different type of pollutant than the offense, but involved
management of potential environmental contamination at the
same facility.215 The requirement that Norwood perform an envi-
ronmental audit at the facility similarly encompassed a broader
scope of pollutants than did the offense.
A variety of arguments can be made to support a broad inter-
pretation of the "offense/harm" criterion. First, the SRA mandates
that courts consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense"
in sentencing. 21 6 Congress enacted environmental statutes for the
public welfare to protect and improve the Nation's air, water and
214. EPA's SEP Policy recognizes this by permitting projects to be performed
at the site of the violation, or within a 50-mile radius of the violation's location, or
within the same ecosystem. See Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 5.
215. EPA's SEP Policy permits projects to focus on pollutants other than the
ones at issue in an enforcement action. Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 5.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1).
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soil, and to protect public health.217 Acts which violate these stat-
utes endanger the public welfare and sentences should be fash-
ioned which help achieve Congressional goals in enacting these
statutes. 218 Second, Congress has declared pollution prevention to
be the national policy of the United States,219 and courts should
seek to incorporate this approach as part of environmental sentenc-
ing. Third, this approach is consistent with that taken by EPA in its
SEP Policy which permits projects addressing different pollutants or
which are undertaken at locations other than the site of the original
violation.220 Finally, this interpretation is also consistent with Con-
gress' directive that the list of conditions of probation contained in
the SRA be merely illustrative, not exhaustive.22 '
C. What Are The Characteristics of The Defendant?
Both the SRA and EPA's SEP policy require the court to ex-
amine the history and characteristics of each violator.2 22 EPA wants
to make sure that the defendant is financially and technically relia-
ble to perform the BEP. The SRA requires courts to evaluate the
defendant to "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among de-
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct." 2 23
Both rationales support having courts carefully examine a de-
fendant's background, history and ability to perform BEPs. Given
the sometimes complex nature of these projects, courts must en-
sure that defendants are sincere in proposing and implementing
them, and in having the necessary financial, technical and legal re-
sources to ensure they are performed properly.
D. BEPs Should Not Replace Imposition of Criminal Fines and
Defendants Should Be Barred From Claiming BEP
Expenses as Tax Deductions
The SRA directs judges to impose a fine or probation or both;
thus courts are authorized to create a sanction which combines
217. See CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a); CAA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401; RCRA
§§ 1001-02, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-02; TSCA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 3601.
218. See id.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b).
220. Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 5.
221. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.Ca.AN. 3278.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1); Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 1.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6).
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both monetary and non-monetary penalties.224 EPA's SEP policy
generally prohibits Agency personnel from using SEPs to reduce
civil penalties to very low levels because the Agency believes such
action will undermine the deterrent effect of enforcement ac-
tions.225 Courts should follow a similar approach in the criminal
arena. Imposition of a sentence which contains a criminal fine and
a BEP creates a significant financial deterrent to the defendant and
others. Substitution of a BEP for a criminal fine could send a
message to organizational defendants that they may commit crimes
and then avoid hefty criminal fines by performing some project af-
ter being caught. This message will undermine criminal enforce-
ment's usefulness in promoting environmental compliance, and
will undermine the public's perception that offenders are being
punished. While BEPs may appeal to many involved in day-to-day
environmental matters, the public may view them as easy punish-
ment. Therefore, there must be a significant "traditional" punish-
ment in the form of a fine, coupled with alternative sanctions such
as BEPs.
Total replacement of a fine with a BEP defeats one of Con-
gress' purposes in enacting the SRA.226 Congress explicitly raised
the maximum amounts individuals and organizations could be
fined when it enacted the SRA,2 2 7 and thus clearly intended fines to
be part of criminal sentences. Probation and restitution are addi-
tional parts of sentences, not total replacements for fines.2 28
Moreover, imposition of fines will rebut the claim that BEPs
divert money away from another laudable legislative goal, the
Crime Victims Fund.229 Combination of fines and BEPs will serve
various Congressional objectives: punishment, environmental pro-
tection, and funding of victim compensation and assistance
programs.
The specific fine amount must be determined on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the stigma associated with criminal prose-
cution that is not present with civil enforcement. A useful guide-
224. Id. § 3551(c).
225. Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 11. When employing SEPs in set-
tlement of enforcement actions, the Agency generally will seek to recover the "eco-
nomic benefit" realized by the violator through noncompliance as well as "part of
the 'gravity component' of the penalty." I. The Agency's concept of economic
benefit is similar to that of "pecuniary gain" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), the
provision of the SRA which increased potential criminal fines.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) (B).
227. Id. § 3571 (b)-(c).
228. Id. § 3572.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b).
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line, however, would be one similar to that taken by EPA in utilizing
SEPs; the fine should at least equal the "economic benefit" realized
by the defendant in committing the offense in order to prevent the
defendant from remaining better off than it would have been
through compliance.230
This is particularly true when considering the differing tax im-
plications presented by criminal restitution or remedial actions. An
organization can not deduct a criminal fine when calculating fed-
eral income taxes.23' However, the costs of a BEP may be claimed
as a business expense when the payments are remedial rather than
punitive in nature or intended to compensate another for loss. 232
Consequently, in negotiating a BEP, the Government should re-
quire the defendant to agree that it will not deduct the costs of the
BEP for tax purposes. If the defendant refuses, then the Govern-
ment should calculate the tax benefits of the BEP and increase the
criminal fine amount appropriately.
E. The Amount of the Fine Should Be Clearly Identified With
Restitution and Other BEP Tasks Separately Classified
Since the SRA does not contain a sentence suspension provi-
sion like the FPA, restitution and probation are equal parts of the
sentence. 233 Consequently, the plea agreement negotiated by the
parties and the sentence pronounced by the court should not con-
sist of a partially or totally suspended fine. Instead, the sentence
should independently reflect the fine, restitution and/or probation
280. Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 11. The term "economic benefit"
means the amount of money saved by the violator through noncompliance. EPA
has different formulas for calculating "economic benefit," depending on whether
the costs were avoided forever, such as in the case of waste water discharged into a
river without treatment, or merely postponed, such as the delayed installation of
air pollution control equipment. The term parallels Congress' use of the "pecuni-
ary gain" concept in setting criminal fines in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). While the fine
provisions of Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines do not specifically apply to
environmental crime, recovery of "economic benefit" is consistent with the Sen-
tencing Commission's directive that fines be set sufficiently high to prevent the
violator from benefitting from the offense. GUIDMNES, supra note 123, § 8C2.4,
comment. According to the guidelines, "[i]n order to deter organizations from
seeking to obtain financial reward through criminal conduct .... when greatest,
pecuniary gain to the organization is used to determine the base fine." Id.
231. 26 U.S.C. § 162(0.
232. For a useful discussion of the tax provisions implicated by this issue in
environmental criminal enforcement, see Allied-Signal 40 Env't Rep. Cas. 1660 (3d
Cir. Feb. 23, 1995). There, after a 17-year battle, Allied-Signal lost its claim that $8
million paid to an environmental foundation it created was not part of a criminal
sentence. The Third Circuit refused to allow the company to claim the $8 million
payment as a business expense. Id.
233. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3561, 3571.
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components. For example, rather than imposing a $500,000 fine
and suspending $300,000 on completion of probationary tasks or
restitution, the sentence should include a $200,000 fine, restitution
and/or probationary tasks. A defendant's failure to comply with
any part of the sentence would make it subject to further action by
the court.
This structure will eliminate any potential Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts Statute or Crime Victims Fund claims. If the fine is clearly
identified as a specific part of the sentence, that is the amount
which is due the Federal Government. Payment of that amount will
satisfy these statutory requirements and prevent any claim being
raised that funds due the Federal Government are being diverted.
F. Regulatory Agency Assistance Should Be Sought by
Prosecutors, Judges and Probation Officers in Evaluating
and Overseeing Implementation of The BEP
All parties should be concerned with who will be responsible
for ensuring the environmental validity of the project and oversee-
ing its implementation by the defendant. Courts will be very hesi-
tant about imposing a BEP as part of a sentence if prosecutors and
defense counsel can not assure judges that experts will assist the
probation officer in making sure the defendant delivers. Prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys must involve regulatory agencies such as
EPA early in negotiations over BEPs. They must persuade regula-
tors that the proposed BEP is sufficiently worthwhile to invest re-
sources in overseeing implementation, particularly if oversight will
require extensive time and effort taken from other competing de-
mands. This involvement is consistent with Chapter 8 which autho-
rizes courts to "consider the views of any governmental regulatory
body that oversees conduct of the organization relating to the in-
stant offense" when probation is imposed for various reasons.234
G. Courts Should Require The Defendant To Take Actions
Beyond Those Already Required by Law Whenever
Possible To Prevent or Reduce Pollution
In the criminal setting, defendants may be ordered to take
clean-up action or some other task required by law in the form of
community service, restitution, or remedial orders. This is appro-
priate given the nature of the criminal process and the broad sen-
tencing goals of the SRA.
234. GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 8D1.4, comment.
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However, criminal justice participants should also be alert for
opportunities to have defendants take actions which will prevent or
reduce pollution, but are not required by law. Defendants should
be encouraged to propose and implement these projects by receiv-
ing a substantial "reduction" in their fine. Examples of such tasks
would be: (1) process changes which reduce actual pollution, (2)
changing employee behavior to reduce individual pollution, such
as commuting patterns, and (3) reductions in the amount of pollu-
tion generated by a particular process or facility.23 5
H. BEPs Should Require, Where Appropriate, That Defendants
Establish Effective Programs To Prevent and Detect
Violations of Environmental Statutes and Regulations
As part of its acceptance of arguments made by "corporate re-
formist" advocates of organizational sentencing, the Sentencing
Commission authorized courts to determine whether organiza-
tional defendants had effective programs in place to prevent and
detect violations of the law.23 6 If they did not, the Commission re-
quired that courts force companies with fifty or more employees to
develop and implement such a program as part of probation.23 7
In the Norwood air case in eastern Pennsylvania, the company
had to establish corporate environmental compliance procedures
and publish an employee manual which satisfied the EPA.23 8 The
program included such matters as a telephone "hotline" which em-
ployees could call to report environmental and other concerns to
upper management without fear of retaliation. It also established
an environmental manager who reported directly to senior man-
agement of the corporate parent rather than to line production su-
pervisors at Norwood.
A similar program was imposed in the recent prosecution of a
shipping business in South Florida. Authorities caught the Viking
Princess cruise ship discharging oily bilge water into the Atlantic
Ocean off the Florida coast in 1993.239 The court imposed a sen-
tence negotiated by the parties which required the ship's owner,
235. See Original SEP Policy, supra note 25, at 6 for examples of pollution
prevention.
236. GUIDEINES, supra note 123, § 8C2.5(f). This factor is one component of
the formula used to calculate fines for organizations convicted of non-environmen-
tal offenses. Id.
237. Id. § 8D1.4(c) (1) (citing § 8D1.1(a) (3))).
238. Norwood Plea Agreement, supra note 28.
239. United States v. Palm Beach Cruises, Plea Agreement SA., No. 94-8049-
CR (S.D. Fl. 1994) (unreported) (on file with author).
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pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to establish
and maintain an effective environmental compliance program con-
cerning the managing of waste oil, including bilge wastes, on the
Viking Princess, plus payment of a $500,000 fine.240
I. Defendants Should Acknowledge in All Public Discussions of
The BEPs That They Result From Criminal Prosecution
Defendants must not be allowed to reap a public relations bo-
nanza by performing BEPs. This would negate the deterrent im-
pact of criminal prosecution and benefit rather than punish the
defendant. Instead, the defendant must be required to acknowl-
edge in all public discussions of the BEPs it performs, such as in
advertisements,2 4' conferences, and seminars, that it is undertaking
these tasks as a result of criminal prosecution.2 42
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal government's environmental prosecutive efforts,
in combination with the expansion of sentencing options for orga-
nizations, present opportunities for courts to impose a "package" of
fines and alternative sanctions which punish the guilty, deter poten-
tial violators, protect the public, rehabilitate the offender, and ben-
efit the environment more than merely having a corporate
employee write a check payable to the United States Treasury.
While not appropriate for every defendant, use of beneficial envi-
ronmental projects is one way of imposing meaningful punishment
on an organization convicted of environmental crime while helping
this country achieve its environmental protection goals. Current
law and public policy support increased use of BEPs, particularly
those which result in the prevention or reduction of pollution.
However, care must be taken when fashioning BEPs to avoid legal
and policy obstacles. In the end, a properly conceived and imple-
mented BEP will achieve Congress' criminal sentencing and envi-
ronmental protection legislative goals much more than would the
mere imposition and payment of a fine.
240. Id. at 4-5.
241. GumLIDNES, supra note 123, § 8D1.4(a). Having the defendant publicize
the crime and its punishment is a recommended condition of probation in the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
242. BEPs can produce favorable publicity for the Government about the
prosecution and sentence which will help maximize the deterrent impact of the
case. See, e.g.,Joseph A. Slobodzian, Malvern Company Gets An Environmentally Correct
Sentence, PHA. INQ., March 2, 1994, at B4 (indicating requirement that defendant
publish advertisements in local newspaper and trade publication stating details of
violation and acknowledging guilt, and noting sentencing judge's approval of pro-
posed sentence).
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